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Abstract 
Union membership and density in Britain has experienced substantial decline since 1979. The 
fall in private sector membership and density has been much greater than in the public sector. 
The size of the union sector, measured by employer recognition, has shrunk. Membership 
decline has been accompanied by financial decline. Much of the decline occurred before 
1997, under Conservative governments. Since 1997 and the return of a Labour government, 
the position has in some respects stabilized. Currently, unions have a substantially reduced 
economic impact, but a continued, if limited, role in workplace communication and grievance 
handling, often as part of a voice regime including non union elements. 
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Introduction 
 
In broad terms, the story of union organization in Britain since 1980 is one of decline.  The 
pivotal year was 1979, when union membership and density in Britain peaked at over 13 
million and 56 percent respectively.  More subjectively, union political power was then very 
strong and union issues were central to national elections in 1974 and 1979.  Regardless of 
the measure of union organization one takes – and we will discuss several below – there is 
less of it in 2005 than in 1979.  The pattern of decline is complex and non linear.  Industrial 
change and government policy – and their interaction – have been important.  The most 
severe decline in membership and density occurred in the 1980s.  In some respects, the period 
since 1998 has seen slight improvement in unions’ position, both politically and 
economically. 
Herein we describe and explain this pattern of change.  The paper is structured as 
follows.  First, we describe the pattern of change in membership, composition, and the 
structure of unions.  As discussed in Section II, Britain has a decentralized industrial relations 
system, and there are considerable data on establishment-level changes in union organization. 
Second, in Section III, we look at the legal and political environment and we argue that 
governmental changes and closely associated changes to industrial relations legislation are 
important factors in union decline.  An important feature of changes in union behavior during 
the period has been the decline in the union wage premium and the disappearance of the 
strike weapon from an economy once regarded as strike prone.  Section IV assesses the 
current state of the union movement and looks forward.  
There are several key data sets.  The most substantial is the recurrent Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey covering the period 1984-2004. In addition there are repeated 
labor force and social attitudes surveys and a set of reporting requirements that generate 
membership and financial data. The main features of these datasets are described in Appendix 
1. 
 
 
2.  Union Membership in Britain, 1980-20041 
 
The Aggregate Picture 
 
Union membership in Britain climbed rapidly during the 1970s, fell from 1980 and began to 
rise again at the end of the 1990s. Since the turn of the century, there has been a slight 
decline. Figure 1a distinguished affiliates of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), still the 
largest apex organization, from all unions. Figure 1b shows a very similar curve for union 
density. 
Part of the explanation for the membership turnaround from 1980 was the sharp rise 
in unemployment which began that year (Kelly, 2005). A trigger for the unemployment 
growth was the shakeout of labor in the heavily unionized manufacturing sector. In 1979 
there were just over seven million employees in manufacturing, but by 1992 the number had 
fallen below four million (Blyton and Turnbull, 1998: 49). Employment expansion occurred 
primarily in private services where union density has always been lower than in 
manufacturing or the public sector.  
                                             
1  Government data on unions and related matters are sometimes collected on a Great Britain basis, i.e., 
excluding Northern Ireland, and sometimes on a UK basis, including it. Where we use the term “Britain” we are 
using the GB basis and where “UK” we are vincluding Northern Ireland.  
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However, by the later years of the 1990s, the situation had changed significantly in 
ways that should have favored a significant resumption of membership growth. 
Unemployment had begun to decline again from its 1993 peak of 10.5 percent to reach just 
5.2 percent in 2002 and 5.0 percent by June 2003. Job losses in manufacturing continued 
throughout the 1990s, albeit at a slower rate than in previous years, but public sector 
employment actually rose by 149,000 between 1998 and 2000, primarily in health and 
education (Bach and Winchester, 2003: 294; Bryson and Gomez, 2002). Union membership, 
however, did not recover. 
The composition of the union movement in 2004 reflects this pattern of employment 
shift.  Public sector union membership is larger than private sector. Density in the public 
sector as a whole is approximately 60 percent and in the private sector it is approximately 20 
percent (Fernie, 2005; 1).  This underestimates the private sector membership loss in that 
privatization of highly unionized transport and communications businesses and energy and 
water utilities “boosted” private sector membership in the 1980s and 1990s. Metcalf (2004) 
estimates that without this input private sector density would have been 16 percent in 2004. 
Occupationally, density is highest (48 percent) in professions primarily employed in the 
public sector, such as teachers and nurses.  Density rises sharply with job tenure but gender or 
ethnicity variances seem absent (Fernie, 2005, 3).  There are two sorts of age effect – age of 
workplace and age of worker. Machin (2000, 2003) uses WERS data (Appendix 1) to show 
that union recognition and density are lower in newer workplaces. Using the Labour Force 
Survey (Appendix 1) he shows that older workers are more likely union members than 
younger workers (Freeman and Diamond, 2003). 
Structurally, the British trade union movement has changed substantially (Table 1).  A 
long term decline in the number of British unions predates the onset of membership decline 
from 1980 (Willman et al, 1993) a decline that has continued apace. The number of British 
unions fell by 56 percent between 1980 and 2004 (Willman and Bryson, 2006). This 
reduction has not been primarily union disbandment but mergers between large unions and 
absorption by them of smaller ones.  Membership concentration has increased: over 80 
percent of union members in 2004 were in unions with over 100,000 members.  Most large 
unions have remained within the national apex organization, the TUC; of the 13 unions with 
over 100,000 in 2004, 11 were TUC affiliates and the two which were not, the British 
Medical Association  (doctors) and Royal College of Nurses, had never been so. However, 
merger growth aside, these largest unions are not growing, and the 50 percent of TUC 
affiliates reporting growth in the 21st century are typically small to medium sized (Willman, 
2005, Kelly, 2005). 
By historical standards, the modern British trade union movement is poorly resourced 
(Table 1).  Willman (2005) estimates union reserves at 1.06  of annual expenditure in 2004 
compared with historical averages of 3.55 for the period 1950-1970, 1.28 for the membership 
decline years of the 1980s and 1.12 for the 1990s (2005: 50). Some of these changes are 
compositional, reflecting the decline and disappearance of older and richer craft and industry 
unions.  However, there is also an income issue. Most large unions collect less than $150.00 
per annum in dues from each member, and no large TUC affiliate covers expenditure from 
membership income alone (Willman and Bryson, 2006). This subscription shortfall reflects a 
very low per member yield as a proportion of average earnings when international 
comparisons are made and may follow from inter-union competition. Although membership 
concentration is high, the merger process that generated large unions also generated 
overlapping job territories, and there is no evidence in Table 1 of any financial benefits for 
unions emerging from membership concentration (Willman, 2005).  
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Establishment Level 
 
Using WERS data, Table 2 shows change by sector in union recognition at the establishment 
level and disaggregates the broad pattern.  In manufacturing the decline was more severe in 
the early part of the period, with the last survey period showing a slight improvement, as 
discussed below.  In the public sector, the decline was confined to the period to 1990. In 
private services, by contrast, the union coverage figures continue to plunge throughout. The 
expansion in private service employment throughout the 1990s is significant. In 2004, 39 
percent of all establishments had trade union recognition, the figure raised by substantial 
public sector presence. 
In reviewing the broad WERS data on unionization to 1998, the principal analysts 
argue for shifts in causation.  Millward et al (2000: 151-2) conclude that, “the decline in the 
closed shop and strong management endorsement of membership were the main reasons for 
the fall in mean union density in unionized workplaces between 1984 and 1990.” But the 
picture is “quite different” for the period 1990 to 1998 when “employees appeared to have 
lost their appetite for unionism.” In a nutshell, in the 1980s unions lost the support of 
government and managers, whereas in the 1990s “they also lost the support of many 
employees.”  
Table 3 is relevant to the first proposition and uses updated information to indicate 
two legislative effects.  The first and more pronounced is the decline in the closed shop -in 
effect compulsory union membership - in the 1980s as it was outlawed. The second 
noteworthy point is the rise in management recommendation of union membership in all 
sectors after 1998 that may reflect the passage of legislation offering under certain 
circumstances a statutory route to union recognition, as we discuss in more detail below2.  
The second proposition is that in the 1990s employee disaffection was a cause of union 
decline. This argument is in part sustained by the pattern of membership loss in the 1990s 
when loss of union density under collective agreements was substantial.  
These issues – managerial and employee attitudes towards unions – are significant 
given the highly voluntary nature of union membership in Britain and are worth exploring 
further. During the period of union decline, the generator of non unionism in the private 
sector was primarily ecological, i.e., it was due largely to a closure of unionized 
establishments and the opening of non union ones.  There was a relatively small amount of 
de-recognition, i.e., employers throwing unions out which may be related to a specific and 
enduring feature of industrial relations in Britain, namely the ability of employers to mix 
union and non union representation and consultation at the establishment level. Bryson et al, 
(2004) show that, even where union recognition remains, many establishments have shifted to 
a mix of union and non union “voice.”  Union only voice regimes are rare by the end of the 
period, but “dual” voice regimes are common. On employee views, data from the British 
Workplace Representation and Participation Survey (Appendix 1) show that substantial 
numbers of employees want representation that is both collective and in dialogue with 
employers. Employees also value independence (Diamond and Freeman, 2001). Many also 
favor a mix of union and non union representational forms (Gospel and Willman 2003, 158-
9).  Perhaps the pattern of low de-recognition and falling membership under collective 
agreements reflects preferences of employers and employees for mixed-voice regimes 
without compulsory union membership and the ability of employers to construct such 
regimes (Willman et al, 2006a; 2006b). 
                                             
2 The question wording was changed fundamentally in 2004.  Managers were no longer asked about the 
presence of a closed shop while the definition of a “strong recommendation” of membership is based on the new 
questions: “Do managers actively encourage union membership or union recruitment at this workplace?” 
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Table 4 and Figure 2 raise two further important points about Britain. Table 4 
provides information on management attitudes about union membership in 1998 and 2004 
using WERS data. Approval of unions is higher in establishments where unions are present 
than where not and higher in the public than in the private sector. Where unions are present, 
approval is rising. However, another feature of Table 4 is the triumph of neutrality. Managers 
in Britain who do not deal with unions are more likely to be indifferent than opposed and, 
indeed, opposition is relatively rare.  
Table 4 may be interpreted positively from the union perspective. However, Figure 2 
shows one effect of the long period of union membership decline, detailing the experience of 
unionization of the British work force. There has been no rise in the percentage of all 
employees who are ex-members.  Ex-members account for about one-fifth of employees; this 
is not increasing, indicating that no major hemorrhaging of members is taking place.  But, if 
unions could stem out-flow, the stock of members would rise.  However, what is perhaps still 
more disconcerting from the union perspective is the big rise in the percentage of employees 
who have never been union members (“never-members”) from around one quarter of 
employees in the early 1980s to one-half by the turn of the century.  This indicates an 
inability to reach a growing segment of the British work force (Bryson and Gomez, 2005). 
Recruitment of never-members could be very resource intensive and, resources are clearly in 
short supply. 
 
 
3.  Government and Law 
 
Events in 1979 ensured that industrial relations in general and union behavior in particular 
were central to Britain’s political agenda during the 1980’s. The winter of 1978-1979 was 
characterized by several public sector disputes disrupting essential services, and in the 
election of May 1979 the incumbent Labour government was defeated by a Conservative 
opposition keen to reform collective labor law in particular.  In what Taylor (2005: 191) has 
described as a “step by step” policy, successive Thatcher governments addressed several 
perceived legal protections for union organization. The lawful scope of industrial action was 
curtailed by restricting the legal immunities trade unions enjoyed when they induced 
members to breach employment contracts. In addition, ballots of members were required 
prior to strikes. The closed shop, securing 100 percent union membership under collective 
agreements, was outlawed. In addition union members gained a number of rights to due 
process within union governance structures. Wages councils, which were effectively sector-
based  minimum wage regulations, were abolished. Looking back from 1990, Freeman and 
Pelletier (1990) argued that these labor law changes had a substantial and negative effect on 
union density. 
However, understanding the full impact of these changes requires reference to the 
industrial policy context. In the public sector, the privatization of utilities and nationalized 
industries, the contracting out of services and the introduction of compulsory competitive 
bidding were pursued from the 1980s onwards. Educational and health service reforms 
decentralized service provision. In the private sector, state subsidies were abolished in many 
sectors. Exchange controls disappeared. Financial services were deregulated, liberalizing 
capital and product markets. The role of government as employer diminished.  All these 
measures raised union organizing costs, diminished bargaining power, and reduced the costs 
of employer opposition.  The decade was characterized by large public sector disputes, most 
notably in mining in 1984 -1985, but these did not substantially affect  the direction of 
industrial policy. 
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Industrial policy changes had substantial industrial relations effects but as Taylor 
(2005: 189 - 91) among others has argued, they did not fundamentally alter the guiding 
principles underpinning union activity in Britain. Historically, although linked financially and 
politically to the Labour Party, British unions had not, as elsewhere in Europe, formed social 
partnerships within agreed regulatory frameworks (Hyman, 2001). The Labour Party had 
been established to secure union freedoms to engage in collective bargaining and the so 
called “voluntarist” system emerging in post-war Britain was primarily based on a set of 
collective immunities from prosecution for strike action combined with legislation to 
facilitate union organizing - such as the closed shop (Clegg, 1979, Kahn-Freund, 1972, 
Gospel, 1992). The “Thatcherite” strategy worked with the grain of this system but 
systematically increased labor market competition while removing legislative props for union 
activity.  
Two important points can be made. First, the trade union response to these changes 
was to urge a Labour Party in opposition that was increasingly wary after the events of 1978-
9 of its close relationship with trade unions to reinstate legal support and immunities for 
union activity (McIlroy, 1998; Hay,1999).  Second, although subsequent Labour governments 
have not responded to this pressure, the legal framework for union activity remains 
fundamentally voluntarist.  The major challenge to this voluntarism is the requirement arising 
from membership of the European Union (EU) to implement Directives designed to 
harmonize labor market practices across the union.  The legislative changes since the election 
of a Labour government in 1997 may be understood in terms of this “moderated” 
voluntarism. 
The overall approach has been described as “fairness and flexibility” (Kilpatrick, 
2003; Dickens and Hall, 2003) which in practice means  the setting, on the one hand, of 
minimum standards for employees and, on the other, the avoidance of measures which would 
constrain labor market flexibility and competitiveness.  As a result, there is little new 
collective trade union law. However, the employment standards legislation has union 
implications. 
The main standard introduced was the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in 1999, 
affecting 1.1 million workers on introduction (Dickens et al, 2005: 18).  Predictably, it has 
led to truncation of the wage distribution at the lower end, but little impact on employment 
levels has been detected. British unions had lobbied for the NMW with Labour in opposition 
and have sought since its introduction to secure compliance (although the main enforcement 
duty is with the tax authorities) and to ensure that subsequent hours reduction or benefit 
erosion did not occur among affected union members (Dickens and Manning, 2004; Dickens 
and Draco, 2005)3.   
Several other pieces of standards legislation originate in European Directives. The 
European Working Time Directive, setting a maximum 48-hour week and a minimum of 4 
weeks holiday for each employee has been implemented. However, individuals may opt-out 
of the hours ceiling by agreement with employers, and the rate of opt-out is high. No opt-out 
of the holiday minimum is available, and average holiday entitlements may have risen 
slightly (Dickens et al, 2005). There are also standards for the treatment of part-time and 
fixed-term workers and for parental (including paternity) leave, again originating in EU 
Directives. 
Many commentators have noted the individualistic rights-based thrust of post-1997 
legislation, but given the attempts of British unions to organize their ways into sectors 
characterized by the part-time, low-paid, and female employees to whom these standards 
                                             
3 Since the establishment of the NMW most union members have been paid approximately £1 per hour [i.e. 
about 20%] more than the NMW (personal communication from David Metcalf). 
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largely apply, they have become relevant to union organization (Heery et al 2002).  Brown et 
al (2000: 627) have argued that employer compliance with individual rights legislation is 
higher where there is union presence, suggesting that collective procedures guarantee 
individual rights. There is some evidence for this for rights to paid leave and job sharing 
arrangements (Budd and Mumford, 2004).  Moreover, in areas such as the control of 
discrimination in employment British law remains rooted in fault-based enforcement rather 
then the dissemination of positive duties on employers and, arguably, the former provides a 
simpler basis for union-led grievance handling (Fredman, 2001). 
The most significant piece of collective employment legislation since 1997 has been 
the reinstatement of a statutory route to union recognition in firms of over 20 employees.  A 
trigger level of 10 percent membership generates a claim to a government body, the Central 
Arbitration Committee (CAC) which may adjudicate on the bargaining unit and call for a 
ballot. There are legal duties on the employer to co-operate and a target of 40 percent 
employee support for the union to secure recognition. The CAC retains enforcement powers 
should the employer not bargain with a union achieving the required level of support (Wood 
et al, 2002).  
The volume of claims is not high and is dwarfed by the number of voluntary 
recognition agreements. Analysis of the industrial distribution of CAC claims indicates that 
they focus primarily on infill recruitment in unionized sectors rather than on the non union 
sector (Moore 2005). However, there is some evidence that the overall level of voluntary 
recognition, particularly in the period after the legislation took effect in 2000, has increased 
as the legislation casts a shadow over employers who are approached about recognition by 
trade unions (Gall, 2004; Heery and Simms, 2005).  
This limited Government response to the union legislative agenda reflects a more 
distant relationship between the Labour Party and British unions than existed at the start of 
the period (Hay, 1999). The financial relationship is maintained, with unions providing 
substantial funding for the Party, although several large unions have disaffiliated.  The 
Labour government’s commitment to the growth of the public sector in the last five years has 
been both aligned with unions’ public policy agendas and beneficial for union organization. 
As Taylor (2005: 198) notes, unions’ place at the high table of government policy making 
evident 50 years ago has disappeared; the role of the apex organization, the TUC, has 
changed (Marsh, 2002). 
 
 
4.  The Impact of British Trade Unions 
 
Having discussed structure and legislative change, we now turn to the effects of British 
unions across the period. The main dependent variables are wages, employment, productivity, 
and financial performance.  The evidence is largely consistent, pointing to a waning influence 
of British trade unions consistent with the evidence of Sections II and III.  
 
Wage Premia and Wage Dispersion. 
 
The most extensive discussion of the union wage premium in Britain is Blanchflower and 
Bryson (2003: 2004) who use LFS data to argue that the evidence for the 1980s and early 
1990s for Britain was that the mean union wage gap was approximately 10 percent (2003: 
203) on an hourly basis. As Table 5, covering the period 1993 - 2000, shows, it subsequently 
fell for all illustrated employee categories. However, the extent of decline varied, and the 
benefits from union membership were very different for different categories in 2000.  For 
male employees and for the manufacturing sector, the premium is negative. For the private 
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sector as a whole, it is small. However, for female employees as a whole, for manual workers 
and for part-time employees the union wage premium is still in excess of 10 percent. Metcalf 
et al.’s analysis  (2001: Metcalf, 2005: 103) using different employment categories, shown in 
Table 6, reinforces the implication that unions are better at protecting low earners and that 
union activity compresses pay structure between genders, ethnic groups, and between the able 
and disabled.  Metcalf argues in particular that union effects on the gender pay gap (2.6 
percent) is greater than that of the introduction of the national minimum wage, which he 
estimates at 1 percent (2005: 102).  He extends what he terms the “sword of justice” 
argument about union impact by arguing that union presence is positively associated with 
family-friendly workplace policies and a reduction in industrial accidents (Bewley and 
Fernie, 2003; Litwin, 2000). 
 
Employment 
 
There are at least two ways of looking at union effects on employment using WERS data: 
differential rates of closure of union and non union establishments and employment growth 
rates in surviving establishments in the two sectors.  
The WERS data from 1980 - 1998 allow tracking of establishment closure rates by 
union status. For this whole period, there appears to be no significant difference between 
union and non union establishments.  In the 1980s (1990s) the annual closure rate was 2.5 
percent (1.9 percent) in non union establishments and 2.3 percent (1.8 percent) in union 
establishments (Metcalf, 2005: 98).  These are raw closure rates.  Using more sophisticated 
modeling, Bryson  (2004a) finds for the period 1990 - 1998 that union presence increases the 
probability of workplace closure by 7 percent, although the result is sensitive to the precise 
definition of closure. Interestingly, he finds the effect more pronounced where unions are 
weak (i.e., low membership density) leading to the argument that the link to closure is not 
through impacts such as the wage premium but rather to the ineffective provision of union 
voice.  
Bryson (2004b) has also examined differential employment growth rates for 1990 - 
1998, finding that unions have a negative impact on employment growth of between 3 
percent and 4 percent depending on the estimation method. He finds the negative impact 
greater in the private service sector overall than in private manufacturing (2004b: 483). 
Looking at the same data over the longer period, Millward et al. assert strongly that this 
relationship is causal and that “unions were still acting to depress workplace employment 
levels in the 1990s, as they had done in previous decades” (2001: 16).  Metcalf (2004) notes 
that for this to be true as the union wage premium falls implies that the employment penalty 
for any given wage premium must have grown, which is consistent with increased 
competition in both financial and product markets.  
 
Productivity and Financial Performance 
 
The evidence on productivity and financial performance effects indicates declining union 
impact.  Metcalf’s (1990) classic study of manufacturing indicated that the negative impact of 
union presence on productivity was disappearing by the mid-1980s.  Card and Freeman 
(2004) investigated the whole economy and dichotomized their period around the “reform” 
year of 1979; they argue that the negative union productivity gap was eliminated between 
1979 - 1999,  accounting for a 4.3 percent gain in average productivity during the period. The 
most recent study (Pencavel, 2004) confirms that there is no longer any difference in 
productivity performance between union and non union workplaces. An exception is that 
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establishments with several unions and fragmented bargaining – only 7 percent of all 
workplaces in 1998 – are still at a disadvantage (2004: 219; Bryson et al., 2005).  
A similar picture of declining impact emerges regarding the effects of unions on 
financial performance.  Metcalf (2005: 95) argues that the literature on the 1980s shows 
pervasive negative impact on firm profitability. More recent studies, in which the dependent 
variable is financial performance compared to identified competitors, show weak 
relationships. Metcalf notes a mild negative effect among establishments identifying few 
competitors, whereas Pencavel’s (2004) results repeat the negative effects of multiple 
unionism noted above. On average, both find no association. 
 
Strikes 
 
Table 7 shows UK (i.e., including Northern Ireland) strike statistics for the period 1981 - 
2004. The predominant feature of the Table is the long-term decline both of stoppage 
numbers and working days lost 1981 - 2000. Large-scale public sector strikes in the 1980s 
often protesting liberalization or privatization largely disappeared in the 1990s which display, 
both historically and by international comparison, low strike rates.  The period 1981 - 1985 
stands out as high conflict but is dominated by the 1984 - 1985 miners’ strike which accounts 
for approximately half of the working days lost in the five-year period.  Given the scale and 
publicity surrounding this dispute and the impact of the defeat of the National Union of 
Mineworkers on industrial relations in Britain, it is speculative but not implausible to suggest 
it had a long-term effect on strike statistics in that it demonstrated that the then government 
was prepared to pursue its privatization policy to conclusion (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986).  
Nonetheless, during this period public sector strike activity was in most years higher 
than private sector, and this is important for the slightly higher rates observed in 2001 - 2004. 
Between 1998 and 2004, public sector employment expanded by over half a million in 
Britain, following a surge of government investment in public services after the change of 
government in 1997 but particularly after Labour’s second election victory in 2001. By 2004, 
British strikes had become largely a public sector phenomenon. In 2004, 91 percent of 
working days lost occurred in public sector strikes. A further 5 percent occurred in the 
transport sector, reinforcing the fact that the manufacturing sector, historically the home of 
Britain’s “strike problem” in the post-war period (Durcan et al., 1983), is largely strike-free.  
In summary, on several measures of impact and particularly on negative economic 
impact, the union movement in Britain has declining effects. It appears to have few negative 
effects on firm performance in the private sector; public sector unionism requires different 
considerations and we will return to it below. Wage premium data indicate that unions may 
help low-paid or otherwise disadvantaged workers. There may be effects on improving the 
quality of the workplace.  
Taken with the evidence of the previous sections our analysis shows a massively 
changed picture of union organization in Britain between 1980 - 2004.  “Decline” would be 
perhaps the most appropriate single descriptor, but the pattern of change carries greater 
complexity than this, and in the final section we disaggregate the picture in an attempt to 
understand the current situation better and to look forward. 
 
 
5.  The Future of British Unions 
 
In this section we address several issues. First, we look at the very different patterns of 
change in public and private sector unionism in Britain and assess their implications.  Second, 
we consider the influence of membership of the European Union on UK unions. Third, we 
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look at the policies and practices of UK unions as they attempt to improve their membership 
performance. The link between these three apparently disparate concerns is their centrality to 
attempts by British unions to “revitalize” the movement. 
There may be a clear distinction between public and private sector employment which 
permits calculation of different density figures for the two sectors, but in Britain the 
distinction between public and private sector unionism is organizationally much less clear. 
All ten of the largest TUC affiliates have members in both sectors.  A long-term driver for 
this has been the tendency of British unions – particularly craft unions – to organize 
irrespective of sector.  However, more recent and more rapid drivers have been, first the 
privatization process which puts employees organized while in the public sector into the 
private and, second, union mergers which have followed no clear sector or industrial logic 
(Willman 1996, 2005). Between 1984 and 2004 private sector union presence (Table 2) fell 
by 34 percent and public sector by 11 percent, so unions with public sector members were 
from a portfolio point of view hedged slightly against the losses in the higher risk sector.  
However, this hedging was limited. If one looks at changes in public sector 
membership an interesting pattern emerges. Large manual unions in the public sector have in 
the 1990’s tended to lose members. Professional unions have grown. Consider two examples: 
Unison, the largest manual union in the public sector and one with very low private sector 
exposure lost 11 percent of members between 1992 - 2002 whereas the five largest teaching 
unions together registered a 28.5 percent increase during the same period (Bach and Given, 
2004). Non TUC affiliates, such as nurses and doctors unions, also grew. Employment trends 
may be important here. For example many manual jobs have been subcontracted out of the 
public sector, while professional employment has expanded over this period.  However, the 
role of professional unionism in the public sector appears also to have changed. 
Large groups of professionals in the public sector have their pay determined not by 
collective bargaining but by Pay Review Bodies which the unions naturally lobby. The role 
of these unions appears to embrace status protection for professionals including protection 
from the public and lobbying to influence public policy on e.g., education and health.  In 
several areas, matters such as skill dilution introduced following government reform 
initiatives impact union membership boundaries as well as terms and conditions, generating 
union campaigns (Bach and Given, 2005; Marsden and Belfield, 2005).  Hence, although 
many manual and largely private sector unions would support expansion in welfare state 
provision – as would the professional unions in the public sector – in many other areas there 
are marked agenda differences.  
Since 1984 union organization in the private sector has thus received two forms of 
“subsidy” from the public. The first is the transfer in of privatized members. The second is 
the intra-union transfer of resources from the higher density and probably easier-to-organize 
public sector. Despite this, the decline is considerable. Table 8, based on the WERS surveys, 
(Bryson et al., 2004) shows the distribution of “voice regimes” in the British private sector 
during the period. “Voice” is defined to exist where there is sustained two-way 
communication consultation or negotiation between employers and employees.  
The key points are as follows. First, as far back as 1984 within the 49 percent 
unionized, only the minority 18 percent of establishments relied on union-only voice; the 
majority supplemented it with non union voice. Second, over the period, non union voice 
expands markedly and both dual channel and union-only voice decline; union-only voice, in 
particular, collapses. However, the proportion of establishments in which no voice occurs has 
hardly changed. Employers have not moved away from voice as defined here, just from 
unionized forms. 
We argue further that Table 8 reveals that the dissatisfaction with union-only voice is 
long standing and that the peculiarities of the British system which allow mixing of voice 
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forms has generated a slow pattern of decline. Employers experiencing declining union 
membership and, as we have seen, declining economic impacts may have felt no severe 
pressures to remove union voice. The decline apparent in Table 8 is partly ecological, driven 
by plant openings and closures and partly compositional, driven by industrial change, but 
very little of it reflects overt union exclusion.  
The second area to examine is the effect of EU membership. Equivocal about the how 
EU policy might affect competitiveness, Conservative governments had opted out of the EU 
“social chapter” – for our purposes broadly equivalent to a set of labor market regulations 
setting minimum standards – but the incoming Labour government in the Maastricht 
Agreement in 1997 agreed to opt back in, opening the way  for labor market changes. Since 
then, EU Directives have established sets of minimum rights. Many of the EU rights have 
been contractual – setting minimum employment standards – but others have generated 
potentially collective rights, such as consultation and information disclosure or rights to 
union membership; none has been auxiliary to the development of collective bargaining. One 
view of these rights is that they are disincentives for union membership, since employees can 
rely on statutory guarantee rather than collective action. A contrary view is that they provide 
a repertoire for grievance representation which generates union joining. 
From 2008, the EU Directive on Information and Consultation will require firms to 
reach certain minimum standards in information disclosure and consultation with employees.  
The standards cover the substantive topics which disclosure and consultation must cover as 
well as the nature of the process (Hall, 2005). In keeping with the UK tradition, enforcement 
is by test of adequacy of existing voluntary provisions rather than imposition of a statutory 
form.  Employees may challenge the adequacy of existing arrangements and, if inadequacy 
exists, the employer must reform or face financial penalty. The legislation affects the largest 
firms (measured by employment) earlier, subsequently being extended to smaller firms. 
The major impact is likely to be on the “no voice” sector identified in Table 8, but the 
Directive will also impact unions, particularly those involved in dual voice regimes. A 
negative view points to the historical British union preference for collective bargaining and 
antipathy to involvement in consultation as predicting the progressive sidelining of unions by 
new statutory representative arrangements (Gospel and Willman, 2003).  A more positive 
assessment involves the creation of such representative structures as an opportunity for 
unions to extend their influence just as German unions have influenced many Works 
Councils. The balance between substitution effect and organizing opportunity will be highly 
significant for British unions. 
The third topic is the activities of unions themselves.  The key point has been made by 
Kelly (2005, 80) that the period since 1997 has been a benign environment for trade unions in 
the form of a relatively friendly government, favorable macro economic conditions and 
public sector employment growth, yet membership and density have not rebounded. Unions 
have not been idle. There have been substantial organizing initiatives and a radicalization of 
union leadership intent on membership growth (Gall, 2004; Charlwood, 2004). But it may be 
that there are endogenous factors cementing recent decline. As in the US, resources may be 
inadequate to the organizing task (Farber and Weston, 2001; Willman, 2005). Moreover, in 
Britain, organizing resources are concentrated as is membership in a small number of large 
diversified unions that despite several decades of merger activity, still compete for members 
across overlapping job territories.  This keeps subscription income down and expenditure up 
(Willman and Bryson, 2006).  
In several previous “spikes” of union growth in Britain, new or small organizations 
have grown into large unions. Two examples are the growth of general unions in the 1880s 
and the growth of white-collar unions in the 1970s. In both cases, previously non union 
groups - the unskilled and white-collar respectively - came into unionism not by the 
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expansion of existing large organizations, but  by establishing “their own” unions. For any 
similar spikes to occur in future, the revival of the current group of oligopolistic service 
providers may not be the central issue.  
We close with an adaptation of Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) question: what do 
unions do in Britain? In 1979, the answer would have included the substantial impact of 
unions on politics, firm performance, and wage premia.  Their impact in these areas in 2006 
is much more limited.  By contrast in 2006 unions appear to do a mix of the following.  First, 
they police the observance of individual employment rights.  They appear to help those who 
for reasons of ethnicity, disability, or gender, suffer labor market disadvantage.  They provide 
part, but frequently only part, of voice regimes in the union sector. In addition, in the public 
sector, they act as quasi-professional organizations protecting members from public policy 
changes. 
This may be a stable position; union membership has changed little since 1997. 
However, the stability may be illusory.  The period has, as we have noted, been politically 
and economically favorable, and one in which one might have expected some rebound. It 
may be merely a pause in a longer decline. 
 
 
  12
References 
 
Adeney, Martin and John Lloyd. The Miners’ Strike 1984-5: Loss Without Limit. 
London: Routledge, 1986. 
 
Bach, Stephen and Rebecca K. Givan. “Public Service Unionism in a Restructured                   
Public Sector: Challenges and Prospects?” In John Kelly and Paul Willman, eds. 
Union Organization and Activity. London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 89-110. 
 
—— . “Union Responses to Public-Private Partnerships in the National Health Service.” In 
Susan Fernie and David Metcalf, eds.  Trade Unions: Resurgence or Demise? London: 
Routledge, 2005, pp. 118-38. 
 
Bach, Stephen and David Winchester.  “Industrial Relations in the Public Sector.” In Paul 
Edwards, ed. Industrial Relations, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, pp. 285-312. 
 
Bewley, Helen and Susan Fernie.  “What Do Unions do for Women?” In Howard Gospel and 
Stephen Wood, eds. Representing Workers: Trade Union Recognition and 
Membership in Britain. London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 92-119. 
 
Blanchflower, David G. and Alex Bryson.   “Changes Over Time in Union Relative Wage 
Effects in the UK and the USA Revisited.” In John T. Addison and Claus Schnabel, 
eds. International Handbook of Trade Unions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003, 
pp.197-245. 
 
——  . “What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be 
Surprised?” Journal of Labor Research 25 ( Summer 2004): 383-414. 
 
Blyton, Paul and Martin Turnbull.  The Dynamics of Employee Relations. 2nd ed. London: 
Macmillan, 1998. 
 
Brown, William, Simon Deakin, David Nash, and Sarah Oxenbridge.  “The Employment 
Contract: From Collective Procedures to Individual Rights.” British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 38 (December 2000): 611-629. 
 
Bryson, Alex. “Union Effects on Workplace Closure, 1990-1998”. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 42 (June 2004a): 283-302. 
 
—— . “Unions and Employment Growth in British Workplaces During the1990s: A Panel 
Analysis.” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 51 (September 2004b): 477-506. 
 
Bryson, Alex, John Forth, and Simon Kirby. “High-Performance Practices, Trade Union 
Representation and Workplace Performance in Britain.” Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy 53 (July 2005) 3: 451-491. 
 
Bryson, Alex and Rafael Gomez. “Marching on Together? Reasons for the Recent Decline in 
Union Membership.” In  Alison Park, John Curtice, Katrina Thomson, Lindsay Jarvis 
and Caroline Bromley, eds. British Social Attitudes; the 20th Report.  Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2002, pp. 43-73. 
 
  13
—— . “Why Have Workers Stopped Joining Unions? Accounting for the Rise in Never-
Membership in Britain.”  British Journal of Industrial Relations 43 (September 2005): 
67-92. 
 
Bryson, Alex, Rafael Gomez and Paul Willman. “The End of the Affair? The Decline in 
Employers’ Propensity to Unionize.” In John Kelly and Paul Willman, eds. Union 
Organization and Activity. Routledge: London, 2004, pp. 129-49. 
 
Budd, John W. and Karen Mumford. “Trade Unions and Family-Friendly Policies in Britain.” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 57 (January 2004): 204-222. 
 
Card, David and Richard B. Freeman. “What Have Two Decades of British Economic 
Reform Delivered?” In Richard Blundell, David Card and Richard B. Freeman, eds. 
Seeking a Premier League Economy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press for 
NBER, 2004, pp. 9-62. 
 
Charlwood, Andrew. “The New Generation of Trade Union Leaders and Prospects for Union 
Revitalization.”  British Journal of Industrial Relations 42 (June 2004): 379–97. 
 
Clegg, Hugh A. The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1979. 
 
Diamond, Wayne and Richard B. Freeman.  What Workers Want from Workplace 
Organisation:  A Report to the TUC’s Promoting Trade Unionism Task Group. 
London: Trade Union Congress, 2001. 
 
Dickens, Linda and Mark Hall. “Labour Law and Industrial Relations: a New Settlement?” In 
Paul Edwards, ed. Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003, pp. 124-56. 
 
Dickens, Linda, Mark Hall and Stephen Wood. “Review of Research into the Impact of 
Employment Relations Legislation.”  Department of Trade and Industry: Employment 
Relations Research Series, No. 45.  London, 2005. 
 
Dickens, Richard and Mirko Draca. “The Employment Effects of the October 2003 Increase 
in the National Minimum Wage.” Report for the Low Pay Commission. London: 
Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, 2005. 
 
Dickens, Richard and Alan Manning.  “Has the National Minimum Wage Reduced UK Wage 
Inequality?” Journal of Royal Statistical Society A 167 (November 2004): 613-26. 
 
Durcan, James W., William E.J. McCarthy and Graham P. Redman, Strikes in Post-war 
Britain. London: Allen & Unwin, 1983. 
 
Farber, Henry S. and Bruce Western. “Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the Private 
Sector, 1973–1998.” Journal of Labor Research 22 (Summer 2001): 459–86. 
 
Fernie, Susan. “The Future of British Unions”.  In Susan Fernie and David Metcalf, eds.  Trade 
Unions: Resurgence or Demise? London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 1-19. 
 
  14
Fredman, Sandra. “Equality: A New Generation?” Industrial Law Journal 30 (June 2001): 
145-168. 
 
Freeman, Richard B. and Wayne Diamond. “Young Workers and Trade Unions.” In Howard 
Gospel and Stephen Wood, eds. Representing Workers: Union Recognition and 
Membership in Britain. London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 29-50. 
  
Freeman, Richard B. and James Medoff. What do Unions Do? New York: Basic     Books, 
1984. 
 
Freeman, Richard B. and Jeffrey Pelletier. “The Impact of Industrial Relations Legislation on 
British Union Density.” British Journal of Industrial Relations  28 (June 1990): 141–
64. 
 
Gall, Gregor. “Trade Union Recognition in Britain, 1995–2002: Turning a Corner?” 
Industrial Relations Journal, 35 (May 2004): 249–70. 
 
Gospel, Howard. Markets, Firms, and the Management of Labour in Modern Britain. 
Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
 
Gospel, Howard and Paul Willman. “Dilemmas in Worker representation – Information, 
Consultation, and Negotiation.” In Howard Gospel and Stephen Wood, eds.  
Representing Workers: Trade Union Recognition and Membership in Britain. 
London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 144-165. 
 
Hay, Colin. The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring Under False Pretences? 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999. 
 
Heery, Edmund and Melanie Simms. “Union Organising Under Certification Law in the 
United Kingdom.”  In Gregor Gall, ed. Union Recognition: Organising and 
Bargaining Outcomes. London: Routledge, 2005. 
 
Heery, Edmund, Melanie Simms, David Simpson, Rick Delbridge and John Salmon.  “Trade 
Union Recruitment Policy in Britain: Form and Effects.” In Gregor Gall, ed. Union 
Organizing: Campaigning for Trade Union Recognition. London: Routledge, 2003. 
 
Hyman, Richard. Understanding European Trade Unionism:  Between Market, Class and 
Society. London, Sage, 2001. 
 
Kahn-Freund, Otto.  Labour and the Law. London: Stevens 1972. 
 
Kelly, John. “Social Movement Theory and Union Revitalization in Britain.” In Susan Fernie 
and David Metcalf, eds.  Trade Unions: Resurgence or Demise? London: Routledge, 
2005, pp. 62-82. 
 
Kilpatrick, Claire.  “Has New Labour Reconfigured Employment Legislation?”  Industrial 
Law Journal 32 (September 2003): 135-163. 
 
Litwin, Adam S. “Trade Unions and Industrial Injury in Great Britain.” Centre for Economic 
Performance Discussion Paper 468, London School of Economics, 2000. 
  15
 
Machin, Stephen. “Union Decline in Britain.” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 38 
(December 2000): 631–45. 
 
—— .  “Trade Union Decline, New Workplaces and New Workers.” In Howard Gospel and 
Stephen Wood, eds.  Representing Workers: Union Recognition and Membership in 
Britain. London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 15-28. 
 
Marsden, David and Richard Belfield.  “Unions and Performance Related Pay; What Chance 
of a Procedural Role?” In Susan Fernie and David Metcalf, eds.  Trade Unions: 
Resurgence or Demise?  London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 138-61. 
 
Marsh, Holly. “Changing Pressure-Group Politics: The Case of the TUC 1994– 2000.” 
Politics, 22 (September 2002): 143–51. 
 
McIlroy, John. “The Enduring Alliance? Trade Unions and the Making of New Labour, 
1994–1997.” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 36 (December 1998): 537–64. 
 
Metcalf, David. “Union Presence and Labour Productivity in British Manufacturing 
Industry.” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 28 (June 1990): 249–66. 
 
—— . “British Unions: Resurgence or Perdition?” Discussion Paper, Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics, 2004. 
 
—— . ”Trade Unions; Resurgence or Perdition: An Economic Analysis.”  In Susan Fernie and 
David Metcalf, eds.  Trade Unions: Resurgence or Demise? London: Routledge, 2005, 
pp. 83-118. 
 
Metcalf, David, Kirstin Hansen and Andrew Charlwood. “Unions and the Sword of Justice: 
Unions and Pay systems, Pay Inequality, Pay Discrimination and Low Pay.” National 
Institute Economic Review 176 (April 2001): 61–75. 
 
Metcalf, David and Andrew Charlwood, “Trade Unions: Numbers, Membership and 
Density.”  In Susan Fernie and David Metcalf, eds.  Trade Unions: Resurgence or 
Demise?  London: Routledge, 2005,  pp. 231-40. 
 
Millward, Neil, Alex Bryson and John Forth. All Change at Work. London: Routledge, 2000. 
 
Millward, Neil, John Forth and Alex Bryson. Who Calls the Tune at Work? Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, Work and Opportunity Series, No.25,  2001. 
 
Moore, Sian. “Union Mobilization and Counter-Mobilization in the Statutory Recognition 
Process.”  In John Kelly and Paul Willman, eds. Union Organization and Activity. 
London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 7-31. 
  
Pencavel, John. “The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain.”  In  David Card, Richard Blundell 
and Richard B. Freeman, eds. Seeking a Premier League Economy. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press for NBER, 2004, pp. 181-232. 
 
  16
Taylor, Robert . “The Public Policy Face of Trade Unionism.”  In Susan Fernie and David 
Metcalf, eds. Trade Unions: Resurgence or Demise? London: Routledge, 2005,  pp. 
185-199. 
 
Willman, Paul. “Merger Propensity and Merger Outcomes Among UK Unions, 1986–1995.” 
Industrial Relations Journal 27 (December 1996): 331–9. 
 
——    “Circling the Wagons; Endogeneity and Union Decline.”  In Susan Fernie and David 
Metcalf, eds.  Trade Union: Resurgence or Demise? London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 45-
61. 
 
Willman, Paul and Alex Bryson.  “Accounting for Collective Action.”  Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics, 2006. 
 
Willman, Paul, Alex Bryson and Rafael Gomez. “The Sound of Silence: Which Employers 
Choose No Voice and Why?” Socio-Economic Review  4 (May 2006a): 283-99. 
 
—— .  “The Long Goodbye; The Rise and Fall of Union Voice in the UK.” International 
Journal of Human Resource Management  forthcoming, 2006b.   
 
Willman, Paul , Timothy J. Morris and Beverly Aston. Union Business: Trade Union 
Organisation and Financial Reform in the Thatcher Years. Cambridge UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 
Wood, Stephen, Sian Moore and Paul Willman.  “Third Time Lucky for Statutory Union 
Recognition in the UK.” Industrial Relations Journal 33 (August 2002): 215-33. 
 
 
 
  17
TABLE 1 
Union Structure and Financial Performance; All Unions, 1990 - 2004 
 
Year Membership      No of Unions Solvency      Reserves 
            (1990 = 100)        (1990 = 100)         (Income/              (Total Funds/ 
                                                                       Expenditure)       Expenditure 
 
 
1990  100  100   1.01  1.15 
 
1991  96.7  95.7   1.04  1.11 
 
1992  91.0  93.5   1.04  1.15 
 
1993  88.3  88.9   1.02  1.14 
 
1994a  83.9  82.7   1.02  0.98 
 
1995  81.9  79.3   1.02  1.08 
 
1996  80.9  75.9   1.05  1.13 
 
1997  79.5  72.1   1.06  1.14 
 
1998  80.0  69.3   1.05  1.15 
 
1999 - 
2000b  80.5  68.4   1.04  1.16 
 
2000 - 
2001  79.3  63.8   1.04  1.18 
 
2001 - 
2002  79.0  61.6   1.02  1.12 
 
2002 - 
2003  77.1  61.0   1.01  1.08 
 
2003- 
2004  78.9  60.4   0.99  1.06 
 
Source: Certification Office returns. 
Notes  
aAffected by an 18 month return from UNISON following formation through merger. 
bMove from calendar to fiscal year. 
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TABLE 2 
Percentage of workplaces with 25+ employees recognizing unions, 1984 - 2004 
 
 1984 1990 1998 2004 
Manufacturing 56 44 28 37 
Services 44 36 23 20 
Public Sector 99 87 87 88 
All 66 53 42 39 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey series. 
 
TABLE 3 
Incidence of the Closed Shop and Management Endorsement of Union Membership in 
Unionized Workplaces, by broad sector, 1980 to 2004 
 
 1980a 1984 1990b 1998 2004 c 
      
All establishments      
  Closed shop 36 28 8 2 .. 
  Strong recommendation .. 30 34 21 41 
      
Private manufacturing 
     
  Closed shop 46 33 15 7 .. 
  Strong recommendation .. 22 29 7 14 
 
     
Private services 
     
  Closed shop 38 27 7 1 .. 
  Strong recommendation .. 22 25 7 37 
      
Public sector 
     
  Closed shop 29 26 5 1 .. 
  Strong recommendation .. 37 42 31 48 
Source: WERS. Figures for 1998 may differ from Millward et al. (2000: 147) due to a reworking of the weights for 
1998. 
Bases: all establishments with 25 or more employees recognizing trades unions, excluding those with missing 
data. 
Notes: a Information on whether management strongly recommended union membership was not collected in 
1980.   bMissing data only affected a small number of cases in all years except 1990 when, due to a design fault 
in the questionnaire, 102 unweighted cases were inadvertently skipped around the question.  In 1990 a further 34 
cases did not answer the question. cThe question wording was changed fundamentally in 2004.  Managers were 
no longer asked about the presence of a closed shop while the definition of a ‘”trong recommendation” of 
membership is based on the new question: “Do managers actively encourage union membership or union 
recruitment at this workplace?” 
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TABLE 4 
Management Attitudes to Union Membership at their Workplace 1998 - 2004 
 
 All, 
1998 
All, 
2004 
1998 
Private
2004 
Private
1998 
Public 
2004 
Public 
1998 
Private 
Union 
2004 
Private 
Union 
         
Not in 
favor 
18% 17% 23% 20% 1% 3% 5% 3% 
         
Neutral 57% 62% 64% 69% 30% 27% 51% 45% 
         
In 
favor 
26% 22% 14% 11% 69% 70% 45% 52% 
 
Source: WERS98 and WERS04, workplaces with 10+ employees.  Managerial respondents were 
asked: ‘”How would you describe management’s general attitude towards trade union membership 
among employees at this establishment? Is management … in favor of trade union membership, not 
in favor of it, or neutral about it?” 
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TABLE 5 
Disaggregated Estimates for the Union Wage Premium (%), 1993 - 2000 
 
 Wage gap 
ave 1993 -
2000 
Wage gap 
1993 
Wage gap 
2000 
Decline 
1993 - 
2000 
All (105,112) 
 
9.9 14.2 6.3 7.9 
Male (51,544) 3.6 9.4 -1.4 10.8 
Female (53,568) 
 
15.8 18.3 13.7 4.6 
Age <40 (56,527) 10.0 15.8 4.4 11.4 
Age >=40 (48,585) 
 
9.4 11.6 7.3 4.3 
White (100,921) 9.9 13.9 6.0 7.9 
Non white (4,191) 
 
9.7 20.8 1.3 19.5 
Public sector (29,712) 13.5 11.0 6.6 4.4 
Private sector (75,000) 
 
5.3 10.2 0.9 9.3 
Manual worker (32,569) 17.0 22.1 12.7 9.4 
Non-manual worker 
(72,490) 
 
6.8 13.2 6.2 7.0 
Manufacturing (20,491) 4.2 11.0 -2.4 13.4 
Non-manufacturing 
(84,621) 
 
11.3 15.1 8.0 7.1 
High education (16,237) 3.8 5.5 2.2 3.3 
Medium education 
(74,632) 
10.0 15.5 4.9 10.6 
Low education (13,903) 
 
13.0 17.4 8.3 9.1 
Full-time (76,968) 6.2 9.9 3.0 6.9 
Part-time (27,932) 16.0 19.0 13.4 5.6 
 
Notes: “High education” = at least a bachelor degree; “Medium education” = some qualifications 
below degree level; “Low education” = no qualifications. Sample is all sectors. Time coded from zero 
in 1993 to eight in 2000. Controls comprise 61 industry dummies, 18 regional dummies, age, age 
squared, 40 highest qualification dummies, 6 workplace size dummies, usual hours, 8 race dummies, 
gender dummy, and a time trend. Time coded from zero in 1996 to five in 2001. Numbers in brackets 
are sample size. 
 
Source: Blanchflower and Bryson (2003, Table 7) calculations using pooled UK Labour Force 
Surveys, 1993 - 2000. 
 
 
  21
TABLE 6 
How unionization affects pay structure by gender, race, health and occupation 
 
Group Unionized % 
Premium 
% 
Without unions, 
wage structure 
would be wider by % 
Male 
Female 
33 
31 
0.0 
8.7 
2.6 
White 
Non-white 
32 
32 
3.9 
8.4 
1.4 
Healthy 
Health problems 
32 
33 
3.9 
5.3 
0.5 
Non-manual 
Manual 
32 
32 
3.0 
12.9 3.1 
 
Notes: Total sample size is 16,489.  Hourly pay premium associated with union membership 
estimated from regression equation with the following controls:  age, marital status, 
qualifications, part-time worker, temporary worker, industry, occupation, region, public 
sector, workplace size, and (as appropriate) gender, ethnicity, and health.  In all the 
regressions but one the coefficient on unionization is significant at better than 1%.  Further 
more, in each pairwise comparison the premia are significantly different from one another at 
5% or better.  The method by which the last column – how much wider the wage structure 
would be in a notional labour market without unions – is calculated, is fully detailed in Metcalf 
et al. (2001). 
 
Source:  Metcalf (2005). 
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TABLE 7 
UK Strike Statistics, 1980-2004 
 
Period  No. Strikes  Working  Working 
     Days Lost  Days Lost 
     [000’s]   [per 1000 
        employees] 
 
1981-5   1274   9374   415 
1986-90   840   3040   129 
1991-5    255   526   23 
1996-00   209   512   21 
 
2001    194   525   20 
2002    146     1323   51 
2003    133   499   19 
2004    130   905   34 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
 
Notes:  Strikes are those in progress in the year.  The employee denominator is based on 
mid-year employment estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Voice Regimes in the Private Sector 1984 -1998, Percentages of establishments 
 
 1984 1990 1998 % Change 
Union Only 18% 11% 6% -66.6% 
Union and Non- 
Union 
31% 27% 19% -38.7% 
Non-union only 26% 37% 51% +96.2% 
No voice 25% 25% 24% -4% 
 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey series. 
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FIGURE 1A 
Membership of Trade Unions Headquartered in the UK and Membership of TUC Affiliated 
Trade Unions 1950 – 2002 
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Source: Metcalf and Charlwood (2005) 
 
 
Notes: 1. tucmembership is that declared by the TUC in its annual report. 
2. CO_UK is the aggregate union membership reported by the Certification Office.
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FIGURE 1B 
          UK Trade Union Density 1950 – 2003 
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FIGURE 2 
   The Rise of “Never-membership” in Britain, 1983 - 2002 
 
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
Never Current member Ex-member
 
 
Source: British Social Attitudes Surveys, various years 
  
  26
Appendix 1 
 
Description of Main Data Sources 
 
The British Workplace Representation and Participation Survey (BWRPS) was a 2001 
survey interviewing 1300 workers in a random location sample. 
 
The British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) is an annual (since 1983) large scale sample 
survey on which employment issues are covered. 
 
The Certification Office Returns are statutory returns covering revenues, expenditures 
assets and membership for all trades unions securing their [partial] charitable status 
 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a quarterly sample survey of households living at private 
addresses in Great Britain. Its purpose is to provide information on the UK labor market that 
can then be used to develop, manage, evaluate and report on labor market policies. The 
questionnaire design, sample selection, and interviewing are carried out by the Social and 
Vital Statistics Division of the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on behalf of the Statistical 
Outputs Group of the ONS. 
 
Strike Statistics are collected by local Employment services agencies for the Office of 
National Statistics and record number and duration of stoppages and working days lost. 
 
The Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) is a nationally representative 
sample survey of British workplaces. It took place in 1980, 1984, 1990, 1998, and 2004. It 
has a cross sectional and panel element. In 2004 it covered 2295 workplaces at a 65% 
response rate. Interviews are conducted with managers, union representatives and employees. 
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